The prevalence of zero dividend stocks has grown over time. In the US, the proportion of listed companies paying dividends fell from 66.5% in 1978 to only 20.8% in 1999. In the UK, the proportion of companies omitting dividends rose to 25.2% in 1999, from previous recession-year high points of 16.1% in 1982 and 17.9% in 1992. A growing strand of literature has focused on the returns performance of zero dividend stocks. Fama and French (2001) draw a distinction between those stocks which have never paid dividends and those who formerly paid dividends but subsequently ceased, implicitly using the latter as a measure of financial distress. We expand the analysis beyond the role of payment history, and also consider the importance of earnings and past returns in the performance of UK zero-dividend stocks. In contrast to the US evidence, we find that payment history is not a significant determinant of returns, while past returns play a far greater role. However, this explanatory power seems to be diminishing over time.
Introduction
A growing strand of literature has focused on the unique characteristics of zero dividend stocks (e.g. Keim, 1985; Christie, 1990 ; Morgan and Thomas, 1998; Benito and Young, 2001; Fama and French, 2001 ). An important feature has been the apparent potential for returns out-performance from this category of stocks. However, the picture is clouded by the heterogeneous nature of this group of companies.
Crudely, we can distinguish between firms which are not paying a dividend because they have so many positive NPV investment opportunities (e.g., until 2003, Microsoft), and those not paying a dividend because they cannot afford to, i.e. firms in distress. We suggest that distinguishing between the two types of stocks will be useful both in seeking high returns within portfolios and in determining asset pricing relationships.
There is an important research agenda in identifying firm characteristics that would enable a focus on those zero-dividend stocks which produce the returns outperformance for the category as a whole. This appears to have been largely neglected in the previous literature. The most significant progress in this direction is the work of Fama and French (2001) , hereafter FF (2001) . They draw a distinction between those stocks which have never paid a dividend, versus those who formerly paid a dividend but who subsequently ceased to do so; implicitly using the latter as a measure of financial distress. Following FF (2001) , we term these groups 'never' and 'former' payers respectively.
We expand the analysis beyond the role of payment history, and also consider the importance of earnings and past returns in the performance of UK zero-dividend stocks. By examining the year-on-year change (calculated monthly) in a firm's market capitalisation, we define each firm as a 'winner' or 'loser' at each point in time (similar to the terminology used in the literature on returns momentum). While a cessation of dividend payments may be indicative of the onset of a state of financial distress, such a state may alternatively be indicated by a transition from 'winner' to 'loser' in terms of the measure used here. The concept of distress (or indeed its converse) is particularly apposite in the context of zero dividend stocks, which, by and large, populate the lower echelons of the market size spectrum; here, a mix of 'rising stars', cases of 'infant mortality' and cases of older (and onetime larger) failing firms prevails.
The prevalence of zero dividend stocks has grown over time, and this growth has accelerated in the last decade. In the US context, FF (2001) Nevertheless, using logit analysis, FF (2001) demonstrate that, other things being equal, there is still a decreasing tendency for US firms to pay dividends. Both of the above studies focus on descriptions of the time path of the proportion of dividend-omitting firms, and attempt to understand the essential characteristics of such firms in order to answer the following question: is the changing proportion due to changing firm characteristics; or a change in the propensity to pay dividends?
Whereas the UK evidence finds a more limited role for a change in dividend policies per se over time, the US findings reveal that the lower propensity to pay is at least as important as the changing characteristics, in the declining influence of dividendpaying firms.
Although these recent studies have drawn attention to the increasing proportion of firms that do not pay dividends, there has been relatively little attention paid to the role of zero-dividend stocks in empirical asset pricing models, though previous studies have found a statistically and economically significant role for the zero dividend characteristic (Keim, 1985; Morgan and Thomas, 1998; McManus et al, 2004 ).
The main contribution of this paper relates to the returns generation and asset pricing aspects of zero dividend stocks, with particular emphasis on the dividend payment history and the past returns of these stocks. In contrast to the US evidence, we find that payment history is not a significant determinant of returns, while past returns (or momentum) play a far greater role. However, this explanatory power seems to be diminishing over time.
An important innovation in the paper involves constructing the firm size variable in a more precise manner than that employed in previous studies using the London Share Price Database (LSPD). Since zero dividend stocks tend to be at the lower end of the firm size spectrum, this is crucial for our purposes. Market capitalisation data within the LSPD is at the annual frequency and suffers from poor resolution. This latter restriction is particularly problematic for the analysis of zero dividend stock during the earlier part of our sample period. Our calculations permit both a monthly variation in market capitalisation, and a much finer size resolution.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant previous literature, while Section 3 discusses portfolio construction and model specification. Section 4 presents the empirical results, including a sub-period analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
The 'special' nature of zero-dividend firms has been discussed in previous literature, notably by Keim (1985) and Christie (1990) for the US, and by Morgan and Thomas (1998) , hereafter MT (1998), for the UK. Both Keim (1985) and MT (1998) find that higher dividend yields are associated with higher returns, except for the zero-dividend class of stocks, which exhibit the highest return of all dividend-ranked portfolios (for US data) and a surprisingly high return for UK data (in both absolute and riskadjusted terms). Further, Keim (1985) finds that much of this extra return to zerodividend stocks was concentrated in the month of January, and was largely associated with the many small stocks in the zero-dividend portfolio. Similar findings were present in MT (1998), though with a more complex seasonal pattern (see Clare et al, 1995) . These descriptive findings led to the specification of an empirical asset pricing relation, which specifically allowed for the non-linearity due to the 'special' nature of zero-dividend stocks. MT (1998) find a highly significant and seasonally-varying and 'never payers', for the purposes of examining their differential characteristics and with a view to determining trends in the investor reward process. They find that 'never payers', relative to 'former payers', are more profitable, have greater investment opportunities, and are characterised by higher ratios of market capitalisation to book value. This paper utilises the mutually exclusive distinction (in the context of zero-dividend stocks) between 'former' and 'never' payers, in order to determine whether returns behaviour is in any way influenced by this classification.
This subdivision also relates to the conjecture, noted earlier, as to possibly differing characteristics between prosperous firms that refrain from the practice of dividend payment in order to harness financial resources for internal investments versus 'distressed' firms that suffer, quite simply, from an inability to pay dividends. It seems plausible that a significant proportion of firms in the 'never' category fit the first description, and that a significant proportion of firms in the 'former' category fit the latter. If this is so, then there may be grounds for believing that these distinctions may have a bearing upon returns performance. Alternatively, an 'efficient markets' perspective may hold that, once risk is corrected for, then the pricing of stocks in the different categories will militate toward a situation of no such difference in returns performance. This discussion leads to the formation of our primary hypothesis: The classification status ('former' / 'never') influences returns behaviour, whereby 'never' payers will outperform 'former' payers. Based on this evidence we suggest that firms with low returns in the previous period may be categorised as being in distress and are therefore expected to underperform in the next period. We choose to employ a more definitive criterion than merely 'low' returns, given that we seek to specifically establish a definition serving to distinguish between distressed and growing companies; we thereby employ strictly positive versus zero or negative returns over the preceding 12 months as our criterion for forming portfolios (see next section). The formation of a second hypothesis follows:
The classification status ('winner' / 'loser' stocks) influences returns behaviour, whereby 'winner' stocks will outperform 'loser' stocks.
In order to investigate the impact of the 'former' / 'never' and 'winner' / 'loser' characteristics on expected returns, we construct an empirical asset pricing model along the lines of Keim (1985) and others by ranking zero-dividend stocks by size and controlling for previously identified influences on expected returns (see MT, 1998 ).
The details of the research design appear in the next section.
Portfolio Construction and Model Specification

Portfolio Construction
We examine stock returns over the period from January 1959 to December 1997 using data from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). We utilise a method of portfolio formation similar to that of Keim (1985) , though our focus here is exclusively upon the separate, zero-dividend class of stocks. In order not to exclude a disproportionate number of these (generally smaller capitalisation) stocks, however, (see Christie, 1990 ), the pre-existence qualification period for stocks is reduced from the 60 continuous months of Keim (1985) to 24 months.
1 Viewing the wider context of all stocks, both dividend-paying and zero-dividend, MT (1998) test the sensitivity of their results on the return-yield relationship to reducing the pre-qualification period from 60 months to 24 months and find no meaningful differences. This supports our choice of a 24-month qualification period. In order to calculate dividend yield (and therefore infer zero-dividend status), there is a need for at least 13 months of prior data; we choose to 'round up' to 24 months for consistency and comparability with previous literature.
2 Furthermore, we eliminate survival bias from our sample by ensuring that the return of an individual firm, which ceases to exist as a separate entity, is written down by -100% in the final month of its existence, unless its value is shown to be preserved through merger or acquisition.
For our data period, it is the case that each additional 12 months of pre-qualification (up to 5 years) reduces the number of companies featuring in the data set by over 8%. This figure, compounded, would result in over one third of returns records being excluded from consideration by the 60-month rule; at 24 months, the reduction is less than one sixth.
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This statement relates to a stock's initial qualification. Where a stock is required to re-qualify following a break in its returns record, the qualification period is set at 14 months. This minimises the probability of a failed company's writeoff return of -100% being masked by the qualification filter.
Thus portfolio formation by (initially) dividend yield closely follows Keim (1985) , Christie (1990) and MT (1998) , using the familiar definition of dividend yield, based upon the sum of dividends DIV t , paid in the months t-12 to t-1 , divided by the price of the stock at time t-13 , (P t-13 ) :
t-1 DY t = (1/ P t-13 ) * ∑ t-12 DIV t ……. (1) When this measure, evaluated for any given month, returns a value of zero, then the particular stock is deemed to be zero-dividend in that month.
In view of the focus in this paper on zero-dividend stocks, the incorporation of market capitalisation information differs from that of earlier papers. In order to develop a responsive, dynamic measure of market capitalisation of the sort recommended by Christie (1990) , the market capitalisation data presented in the Returns file of the LSPD was rejected in favour of an alternative measure. The LSPD market capitalisation data suffers from poor resolution, both in terms of magnitude and of time; amounts are given to the nearest integer £1m, too crude a measure to rank smaller firms in a fashion smooth enough to result in balanced quintiles; also, the data is annual, which precludes the rapid re-classification required in order to take account, in particular, of firms announcing dividend cuts and suffering rapid changes in share price as a result.
The measure of market capitalisation used here is based upon the product of share price (at the end of the preceding month) and the number of shares outstanding. The latter figure is given each year in explicit form for the beginning of January; this information is factored (if necessary) through the year, using the 'Adjustment Factor', which is provided in the LSPD database to take account of capital changes (e.g. Scrip,
Rights issues, etc.). Thus in the months February -December, the number of shares outstanding is taken as being unchanged from the previous month, unless an Adjustment Factor is quoted; however, each January, the 'annually updated' figure is taken as definitive. Discrepancies are in any case small, and are ascribed to the timing of the measurements; however, using the above scheme, potential errors are not allowed to cumulate beyond 11 months.
The result of these manipulations gives rise initially to five portfolios, ranked and assigned to quintiles by market capitalisation. Portfolios are dynamically re-balanced on a month-by-month basis. This ensures that each portfolio remains populated by 'like' firms through time. For each portfolio, there exists a time series of 468 monthly observations. 5 Figure 1 shows the variation, over time, of the number of firms in the zero-dividend category (across all firm sizes). Thus, numbers of firms in the zerodividend category approximate to 100 in the first half sub-period, fluctuating and rising to 250 by the end of the second sub-period. Note that a 'step' increase occurs between January and February 1977, due to significant new admission changes to the LSPD which had occurred two years previously to this date, and which (firms) had now emerged from the 24-month qualification period. 6 Only the addition of "all British quoted companies", however, significantly affects the zero-dividend stock numbers. Nevertheless, it is clear that the inclusion into the sample of this tranche presages an increase in the mean, trend and (business) cyclical components of the zero-dividend stock population. The subdivision of these stocks by capitalisation is substantially equal; thus, at the end of the period, the number of firms in each of the five portfolios approximates to 50. In 1971, the largest companies (by market value in 1976) and "Times top 1000" 1976 (quoted companies only) were added to the LSPD database, and in 1975, "All British quoted companies" were included. Other, smaller samples were added at various other times, but these two tranches represented the major additions. 'split' each of them into two separate portfolios (for each month). In the first instance, the split is according to the 'former' / 'never' distinction. In the second strand of the analysis, 9 it is along a dimension defined as that of 'winner' / 'loser', whereby 'winner' firms are defined as those whose year-on-year market capitalisation strictly increased up to the month preceding the month of portfolio formation, and all other firms are classed as 'loser'. The prior-month's year-on-year change in capitalisation would be (by construction) known to investors at the time of portfolio formation.
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Portfolios are re-balanced according to the relevant criteria each month, and populated by qualifying firms as discussed earlier. Thus, from this point, the discussion will focus around 10 portfolios in each of the two strands of the analysis.
Model specification
We extend the basic empirical relationships involving returns to include other firm characteristics which are believed, on a priori grounds, to be important (see Keim, 1985 and MT, 1998); and include these as explanatory variables. Following this, a measure of the year-on-year change in market capitalisation is generated; firstly in regard to individual firms, subsequently (following aggregation)
at the level of individual portfolios. This is then expressed in the form of a ratio by dividing by current total market capitalisation of the portfolio. This measure is 9
Whilst the two studies may have been combined by establishing a three-dimensional portfolio structure, the simpler two-dimensional (Size / Former-Never, or Size / Winner -Loser) structure was retained both in the interests of clarity and implementation. In addition, the moderate size of the Zero-Dividend sample militated against the creation of more portfolios with smaller numbers of firms -indeed, even with the simpler structures, not all portfolios are represented in all months).
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It is also important to note that the period (of one year) is exactly that used to calculate dividend yield / zero dividend status, ensuring a consistency among the various measures.
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Fama and French (1993) consider earnings yield as a candidate variable conveying similar information to the Book / Market ratio for the US market. International evidence to this effect, including the role of dividend yield, is provided in Fama and French (1998).
intended to relate closely to that which determined (see section 2.1) the status of 'winner' versus 'loser' firms.
Control for market (covariance) risk follows closely the procedures used by Keim (1985) and MT (1998). The 'Market' Return is taken to be the return generated by an equally weighted portfolio comprising all qualifying stocks (including dividendpaying stocks). The vector of returns on one-month Treasury bills is used to generate the 'risk free' asset.
Provision for seasonality influences also draws from the results of additional work (not reported here), which rejected, for example, the presence of a seasonally varying CAPM Beta (in common with MT, 1998). Provision for such interaction is therefore excluded here also. However, provision for seasonal dummy variables, and seasonal interaction variables (with size), for the months of January and April are included.
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The modelling approach chosen is one in which a rich set of interaction variables allows the necessary freedom for the data to express differences in parameter values across relevant dimensions. A difficulty remains, in that the number of possible interactions varies virtually as a function of the square of the number of the underlying regressors, and potentially gives rise to complex equations with many terms. Here, the use of a priori information, as alluded to above, provides a guide to mitigate this effect. A compensating advantage, however, is that inferences allowing the imposition of zero restrictions on insignificant parameters are relatively more straightforward than is the case with techniques based upon joint estimation approaches.
The model to be estimated is defined below, whereby the primary focus is on size dummy and interaction variables:
Firstly we define: δ n as: {β n0 + β n1 .D1 t + β n2 .D2 t + β n4 .D4 t + β n5 .D5 t }…. n = 0,1,2,3,4
The additional analysis of seasonality is not reported here in the interests of brevity, but is available from the authors on request. The January and April variables were those found to be significant. Equation (2) where p = 1 to 10, t = 1 to 468; N 0p is a dummy variable (which we label 'never') taking the value 1 if the portfolio comprises those firms who have never paid a dividend, and takes the value 0 otherwise; EY pt is the monthly earnings yield for portfolio (p) in month (t); and LSIZE pt is the natural logarithm of the average market capitalisation (£M) of the portfolio in a given month. 13 DJ t and DA t are dummy variables taking the value 1 in January and April respectively, and zero otherwise.
When their respective products are formed with the size variable LSIZE pt , the required vectors for estimating the interaction coefficients are realised. π 0 , π 1 , κ 0 and κ 1 are the associated parameters.
The above formulation, whilst not quite exhaustive in terms of all possible interactions, is intended to capture (based upon a priori considerations) the important possible influences affecting stock returns, within the limits of available data.
However, our diagnostic tests indicate that, at the 1% level of significance, none of the original five (size-quintile based) portfolios are problem-free in relation to heteroscedasticity or non-normality in the residuals. Both the largest and the smallest size portfolios exhibit, in addition, significant autocorrelation (at the 1% level). Hence we reject OLS estimation in favour of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).
13
This corresponds to the use of an arithmetic rather than geometric average for the portfolio capitalisation figure. The reason is that the output from the portfolio grouping procedure requires the use of non-logarithmic quantities for the calculation of the 'proportionate change in size' and the 'Earnings Yield' variables pertaining to the portfolio.
Estimation of the above model is conducted using GMM in conjunction with the heteroscedasticity -consistent estimator of White (1980) and autocorrelation correction of Newey and West (1987) . Estimation in the first instance produces 30 parameters; however, we apply the process of attaching zero restrictions to insignificant parameters by following the usual backward-elimination algorithm, whereby the parameter with the least case for inclusion (i.e. having the highest pvalue) is eliminated; followed by repetition of the process until only those parameters having levels of significance at the chosen level remain in the equation. 
Empirical Results
Estimation based upon the 'former' / 'never' classification
The results of the estimation of the first model, based upon the 'former' / 'never' subclassification of FF (2001) , are shown in Table 2 , following application of the 14 The constant term, whatever its level of significance, remains in the equation. 15 We label this dummy variable 'winner' firms.
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The year-on-year change in the market capitalisation of each firm is calculated over the preceding 12 months prior to the "current month" to which the record relates. These values, when aggregated over each (equally-weighted) portfolio, form the year-on-year change in the market capitalisation of that portfolio. This latter figure (for each portfolio) is then divided by the aggregate market capitalisation of the constituent firms in the portfolio, delivering the ratio referred to above as "the proportionate year-on-year change in the market capitalisation of the portfolio", and which is designated the variable name 'DELCAP'. backward elimination process. Seven parameters (of the original 30) are tabulated, having included the size / covariance risk interaction parameter β 15 , which just fails to be significant at the 10% level. All parameters associated with the 'never' dummy variable (and its related interaction variables) were found to be insignificant, and were eliminated at an early stage in the backward elimination process. This evidence indicates rejection of our primary hypothesis, suggesting that the characteristics of zero dividend stocks in the UK differ qualitatively to those in the US market, in that they cannot be differentiated by payment history in the same way as that found by FF (2001) . It is evident from the modest value of R 2 that the zero-dividend returns model Table 2 ).
Values of CAPM beta (β 10 ) for the four largest-firm portfolios are not significantly different from 1, at a value of 1.05. However, the beta value of the smallest-firm 17 Commonly referred to as Jensen's (1968) 'Alpha', this parameter was shown by Merton (1973) to be indistinguishable from zero in a well-specified asset pricing model when the explanatory variables are expressed in the form of excess returns (as here, in the case of the Market Portfolio) or as returns on zero-investment portfolios. In the case of characteristic-based models, the use of mean-zero explanators should realise the same effect. Informal tests here, using mean-zero explanators, produced little change in the values of the parameters, indicating that the Alphas (in the notation here, β 0 's) realised by the above regressions may be considered as reliable measures of the excess returns generated by the portfolios, assuming the validity of the associated models.
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Portfolio 5 corresponds to the smallest-stock, zero-dividend portfolio.
portfolio (β 15 ), as indicated by the interaction term with the portfolio 5 dummy variable is lower by 0.25, at a value of 0.8.
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The value of β 30 , the coefficient operating on the monthly earnings yield metric, is both positive and statistically significant. However, its economic significance is relatively small. Given that the mean monthly per-unit EY figure (over all portfolios over the full period of the regression) is 0.0285, an incremental change in EY equal to this mean value, when operated upon by the coefficient β 30 , would produce, ceteris paribus, an increase in excess return of only 0.04% per month.
In the model being investigated here, the size effect is chiefly expressed by the variables β 04 and β 05 , since these relate to the excess returns on size-sorted portfolios; moreover, this expression of variation is characteristic of the magnitude of the 'between-portfolio' variation (Berk, 2000) which captures the greater part of any variation induced by such an effect. However, the 'within portfolio' variation in Portfolio 2 is captured by the coefficient β 42 , which has the expected negative sign, indicating greater realised returns for smaller companies.
Estimation based upon the 'winner' / 'loser' classification
The results of the estimation of the second model, based upon the 'winner' / 'loser' sub-classification, are shown in Table 3 . On this occasion, sixteen parameters (of the original 30) are tabulated, including all parameters significant at or below the 10% level, and including the (now insignificant) β 00 . Although the values have shifted slightly, the situation regarding the remaining β 0m and β 1m parameters is essentially the same as that of the previous analysis.
The interpretation of the situation associated with β 2m 's, the coefficients of the 'winner firms' dummy variable (and its related interaction variables) is interesting. In order to more clearly assess its effects, a subsidiary table (Table 4) is presented, the purpose of which is to present the computed absolute coefficient values for each size 19 This low value is consistent with that determined by a simple exploratory 'market model' OLS regression (e.g. as used by MT, 1998) based upon the use of a one-period Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to generate abnormal returns, i.e: R pt -R ft = α p + β p (R mt -R ft ) + u pt . (where p is used to index portfolios, t to index months). portfolio 20 and their associated standard errors. 21 Table 4 indicates that the absolute coefficients associated with the 'winner firms' dummy variable for the two largest portfolios are insignificantly different from zero. However, the absolute coefficients associated with the three smaller 'size' portfolios are significantly negative, and decrease sharply toward the 'smallest' portfolio. On the basis of this evidence, our second hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of the three smaller portfolios.
Furthermore, the negative coefficients indicate a returns penalty for (smaller) 'winner'
firms, suggesting that a degree of overpricing (of these firms) may be present.
A closer examination reveals that the situation is more complex. The coefficient (θ) of the DELCAP variable (the proportionate year-on-year change in the market capitalisation of the portfolio) is positive and significant, indicating the precise converse to a returns penalty for 'winner' firms. Clearly, although the two sets of variables set out to convey different information to the equation, they do in practice act as confounding and competing variables.
The effect of omitting the DELCAP variable is to (approximately) halve the value of the β 20 coefficient, while leaving the differential effects captured by the interaction variables (associated with the 'winner' firms dummy) substantially unchanged. Table   5 indicates the shift from the values displayed in Table 4 . An overall upward shift in the values of the absolute coefficients gives rise to a situation in which the 'largest firms' portfolio has a marginally significant positive value, with the same decreasing trend occurring through to the 'smallest firms' portfolio. All other coefficients in the equation remain substantially unchanged. Addressing the issue of the confounding variables by adopting the opposite approach, namely excluding the 'winner' firms dummy and interaction variables and re-introducing the DELCAP variable produces a negative coefficient (-0.00345) at a significance level of 18.4%. This provides weak supporting evidence of the returns penalty effect, but the model using the 'winner' firms dummy and interaction variables is preferred, since it provides more detailed information across the 'size' dimension. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude 20 Achieved by summing the coefficients of the dummy variable and the associated interaction variables.
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This is computed as the square root of the sum of squares of the dummy and interaction variable standard errors reported in Table 3. that the returns penalty effect prevails among the smaller firms' portfolios, with weak evidence of the opposite being true of the largest firms' portfolio.
The final choice of model (designated Model 3) is obtained by eliminating the DELCAP variable, together with the elimination of the (now insignificant) β 45 variable. These results appear in Table 6 . The comparison of Model 3 with the earlier Model 1 (Table 2) 
Estimation over sub-periods based on the 'winner' / 'loser' classification
It now remains to perform a sub-period analysis on the available data, in order to examine the parameter stability of the model. Parameter stability is a consideration often overlooked in asset pricing models (see Clare et al, 1997). Model 3 is used to estimate, separately, the two sub-periods 1959-1977 and 1978-1997 . This separation also has the benefit of accounting for the changing constituents of the LSPD (see section 2.1); the latter period provides a consistent universe of stocks. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the estimations.
All three cases (Tables 6-8) Even here, the effect is much reduced.
The second period β 30 coefficient just fails to be significant at 10%; however, its value falls to one-tenth of that in the first period (significance level 16%), and is indicative of a substantial decline in the magnitude of the earnings yield effect. With the size effect for the smallest stock portfolio having expressed itself through the 'between portfolio' β 05 , that for the two largest stock portfolios is expressed via the 'within portfolio' coefficients of β 41 and β 42 , which have the expected signs, but whose significance alters (in opposite directions with time) from high significance (<1%) to low significance (~16%).
The January effect, expressed through the coefficient π, appears to dissipate in the later period. In contrast, the April-size interaction remains (with increasing significance), though the value of its coefficient decreases. Finally, it is noteworthy that the explanatory power of the model rises substantially in the second sub-period, to a value close to 40%.
Conclusions
For the UK, we find that knowledge of dividend payment history ('former' versus 'never' payers) does not provide guidance in the formation of zero dividend stock portfolios. This is in direct contrast to US results reported by Fama and French (2001) . The paper finds evidence to support the usefulness of a 'winner' / 'loser' distinction and also an earnings yield effect. However, the evidence from the subperiod analyses shows conclusively that the effects fail to be persistent into the later period.
A further caveat is in order here. The changing nature of the effects noted may not have been due entirely to changes in the performance of markets over time; as already noted above, there was a significant influx of new firms into the database in 1975.
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Any differential characteristics associated with the incoming firms (relative to those firms analysed in the first sub-period) would have impacted the second sub-period analysis in a way additional to any changing characteristics of firms or markets over time.
The evidence suggests a decline in the levels of anomalous behaviour with the passage of time into the second sub-period; with the possible implication that the market, insofar as zero dividend stocks are concerned, became more efficient in pricing this class of securities as the level of research coverage has grown. Whilst the β 05 coefficient provides the greatest challenge to this conclusion, the liquidity and friction problems (e.g. higher bid-ask spreads) associated with trading these securities would tend to drive up the expected returns demanded by investors, leaving traces in the data to be captured by, in particular, the β 05 coefficient. Even the much-vaunted January effect, a particular feature among small stocks in the US market (Keim, 1985;  Christie, 1990) appears, from the above evidence, to be in decline, though a small 'April effect' does persist among the larger zero dividend stocks.
Due to differing methodologies, our results are not directly comparable with the returns momentum literature. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this finding is the exact opposite to that found by Hon and Tonks (2003) , whereby they find momentum profits for the UK stock market for the later period but not during the earlier period. Although the focus of the current paper has not been to formally test momentum strategies, there is potential for further research on the instability of their profitability across different categories of dividend-paying stocks as well as time.
These new entrants potentially influenced our regressions from 1977 onwards, following the 24 -month qualification period imposed (see section 2.1). ^ The coefficient estimate of dummy variable D4 was found earlier to be insignificantly different from zero, and is assigned that value. ^ The coefficient estimate of dummy variable D4 was found earlier to be insignificantly different from zero, and is assigned that value. Adjusted R-squared = 0.29 Number of Observations = 4622 ** significant at the 1% level * significant at the 5% level Adjusted R-squared = 0.21 Number of Observations = 2241 ** significant at the 1% level * significant at the 5% level 
